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Abstract
We study the price response of national brands to the development of
private labels. We use monthly data from a consumer survey reporting their
purchases for 218 food products. We show that when private labels have a
significant effect on national brands prices (144 cases over 218), that is pos-
itive (89%). We also show that the increase in the prices of national brand
products is explained by a strategy of product differentiation. Finally, price
reaction of national brands differs with the type of private labels they are
facing. This paper confirms, on a larger number of products, previous em-
pirical results.
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1. Introduction
Private labels are now a key element of the assortment of retailers.1 In the
European food sector, they represent 10% to 40% of the total sales depending
on the countries. As a general observation, the level of concentration of the retail
industry and the market share of private labels are positively correlated. Moreover,
in almost all food categories, private labels now compete with producer brands.
Facing this new competition, producer brands need to adapt their strategies both
in term of prices and of characteristics of the products.
Berges et al.(2004) recently survey the literature dealing with the economic
impact of private labels development. In particular, this survey shows that theo-
retical papers conclude that the threat of a private label entry or its actual introduc-
tion will cause a decrease in the price of national brands while recent empirical
studies do not support this view. It also shows that there is a limited number of
empirical work that studies the impact of private labels development.
The objective of this paper is to estimate the price reaction of national brands
to the development of private labels in France. It generalizes to a larger number of
products and to a longer period the analysis defined in Bontemps et al. (2005).2
The general methodology is similar to the one used by Ward et al (2002). How-
ever, it extends their analysis in two additional dimensions that were not present
in empirical studies. First we distinguish different categories among private la-
bels. It is now well established by marketing studies that there exist at least three
categories of private labels (’low price’, ’me-too’ and ’high quality’). We thus
test whether the price reaction of national brands differs across private labels cat-
egories. Second we incorporate the changes in the characteristics of the products
that are proposed by national brands producers. This is because brand producers
can react to private label development not only by changing the prices of their
products, but also by modifying the product themselves (for a theoretical analysis,
cf. Bontems (2005)).
To address these issues, using data from a panel of consumers, we built time
series of market shares and prices of national brands and private labels for different
food products. We then study how prices of the different national brands react to
the development of private labels. In Section 2, we briefly summarize the main
1According to the Private Label Manufacturers’ Association (PLMA), "[Private label] products
encompass all merchandise sold under a retailer’s brand. That brand can be the retailer’s own name
or a name created exclusively by that retailer. In some cases, a retailer may belong to a wholesale
group that owns the brands that are available only to the members of the group.
2The reader will find a more detailed review of literature in this paper. However, for clarity of
presentation, we present in this paper the model used.
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findings of the empirical literature. Then, Section 3 presents the methodology
used to estimate the impact of private labels development on national brands prices
in France. In Section 4, we describe the data used. We present the results in
Section 5 , and conclude in Section 6.
2. An overview of recent empirical studies on the impact of private labels
development
Recent empirical studies investigate the impact of private label development
on prices. Ward et al. (2002) study the impact of the development of private
label in the US. They use monthly data on prices, market shares, and advertising
expenses for 34 product categories. For each category, they analyze how national
brands react to the development of private labels. They show that an increase in
the private label market share is consistent with:
• An increase in the price of national brands (or no impact).
• A decrease in the price of private labels (or no impact).
• A negative impact or no impact on average prices.
• A decrease in advertising activity for national brands.
Using the same methodology, Bontemps et al. (2005), using French data on 6
dairy products, show that an increase in the private label market share is consistent
with an increase in the price of national brands. Moreover, they show that the price
reaction of national brands differs with the type of private labels they are facing.
The study also reveals that the price increase in national brand products is partly
explained by a strategy of product differentiation.
Gabrielsen et al. (2002) study the impact of the introduction of private la-
bels in Norway for 83 products. For each product, they study changes in national
brand prices over time and distinguish the period before the entry of private la-
bels from the period after entry. When the impact of private labels introduction is
significant (17 cases over 83 products) the impact is positive (15 cases). The in-
troduction of private label induces an increase in national brand prices. Moreover
their results suggest that the increase in national brand prices is larger for leading
and nationally distributed brands.
These three studies thus conclude to a positive impact on national brand prices
from private label development. However, Chintagunta, Bonfrer and Song (2002),
using data on sales from different stores of a large supermarket chain, study the
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impact of the introduction of private labels in the breakfast cereal market. They
show that private label introduction leads to a decrease in the price of the leading
national brand, a decrease in the promotional activities of the national brand and
no change in the profit margin of the retailer on the national brand. Bonfrer and
Chintagunta (2004) obtain mixed results. In about half of the cases surveyed, the
study finds that the entry of private labels leads to an increase in national brand
prices. Whereas, in the remaining cases, it leads to a price decrease.
3. Models
Because there is no single clear view of the impact of private development
on the strategies of national brand producers, this paper tests different models in
reduced forms. Following Ward et al. (2002), the reduced-form specification of
the first model we develop is written as:
lnPk = βk · lnMSk+∑
s
αs ·δs+C (1)
with Pk the price of national brands for the product category k, MSk the private
label market share for the product category k, δs quarterly dummies, and C a
constant.
As explained in Bontemps et al. (2005), national brand producers can react to
private label development by using a product differentiation strategy, or by devel-
oping new products. Product categories used in empirical studies are aggregates
of heterogeneous products. Thus, a change in the national brand price in a product
category could result in a change in the composition of the aggregate, rather the
price of each item of the aggregate. To distinguish between the price reaction with
constant characteristics of the national brands and the change in the characteristics
of the product, we estimate a more complete model than (1) specified as:
lnPk = βk · lnMSk+ γk ·
VolSpek,NB
Volk,NB
+∑
s
αs ·δs+C (2)
where VolSpek,NB/Volk,NB is an index of differentiation of the national brand, which
is the ratio between the national brand sales within a specific subcategory over the
national brand total sales for product category k.3 A high value of this ratio means
3A specific subcategory is defined as a set of products that are more ’sophisticated’ products
(as compared to the category), priced at a higher price and for which national brands have a high
market share.
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that national brand producers target their production to the specific subcategory
that supports higher prices.
In order to analyze the impact of the different private labels on the price of
national brands, we test two additional models that are more complete than (1)
and (2). They are specified as follows:
lnPk = ∑
j
βk, j · lnMSk, j+∑
s
αs ·δs+C (3)
lnPk = ∑
j
βk, j · lnMSk, j+ γk ·
VolSpek,NB
Volk,NB
+∑
s
αs ·δs+C (4)
where MSk, j are the market shares of the jth private label type for product category
k.
4. Data
We conduct our tests using data from a panel of French consumers (SECODIP
panel). The dataset covers 218 product categories. Among them, we select 21
product categories, for which we apply models 1 to 4.4 To estimate models 2 and
4, the definition of a specific subcategory is required. It is based on the analysis of
the characteristics of the goods that composed a product category and cannot be
done automatically. However, in order to extend the analysis to a larger number
of product categories, we run the models 1 and 3 on all product categories.
We consider 5 types of brands. The first two are traditionally considered as
private labels, the third corresponds to low-price products, while the last two are
producer brands. They are defined as follows:
• Hard Discount products (HD) are sold exclusively by hard discounters.
• Private Labels (sensu stricto) (PL) are developed exclusively by retailers.
• First-Price products (FP) correspond to brands sold at low prices. We define
them as brands that are neither HD nor PL, and whose price is lower or equal
to the price of HD products. They are generally considered as the response
4In this sample, we focus on dairy products (including the 6 dairy products used in Bontemps
et al. (2005)) and on other basic food products. For statistical reasons, we choose the categories
having a large number of observations.
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of supermarkets and hypermarkets to the development of hard discounters.
In this way, one can consider them as private labels.
• National Brand products (NB) are brands that are not private labels (the first
three categories), and that are sold in more than 50% of French regions.
• Regional Brand products (RB) are the other brands, that is, brands that are
not private labels, and that are sold in less than 50% of French regions.
For each product category, we build a time series of market shares and prices
for the five different types of brands. Thus, for each product category, we
design different subcategories and build the corresponding time-series. The
dataset covers four years: 1998-2001. We define 52 periods of 4 weeks over
the whole period.
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Figure 1: National Brands Market Share vs Relative Price
6
In Figure 1, national brands market shares are plotted against relative prices, de-
fined as PNB/PPL, for the 21 product categories. We note a significant (p-value
= 0.006) and positive relation between the national brands market shares and the
relative price. The higher the relative price, the larger the national brands market
shares. This relationship is coherent with the analysis developed by Mills (1995)
which takes into account the differentiation between national brands and private
labels. As explained by Mills in prediction 2 (p.523), “In a cross section of prod-
uct categories where retailers sell both national brands and private labels, the
private labels’ share of category unit sales (...) vary inversely with ∆ p (difference
in national brand and private label prices)”.5 Thus, when national brands market
share is low, this means that for the consumer the perceived quality of national
brands and private labels are similar. The price competition is thus tougher. On
the contrary, if the national brand is perceived of significant higher quality, then
a ‘large’ difference in price is compatible with a large market share for national
brands.
Table 1 displays some statistics for private labels (PL+HD) and national brands
for the 21 product categories. Within each category, the national brands product
price is greater than the average price (set at the index 100). Conversely, the pri-
vate labels price is smaller than the average price in most cases. The market shares
of national brand products vary greatly across categories (from 18 % for emmen-
tal up to around 80% for colas and fresh cheese). Private labels market shares
are less variable and rarely reach 50% (ranging from 14.30% for fresh cheese to
61.4% for ham).
The per-period (4 weeks) variation of market share (ρ in Table 1) reveals a
clear development of private label over the period. For all the product categories
but two, when the trend coefficient of private labels (PL+HD) is significant, it
is positive.6 The average growth of private label market share is greater than
0.1% per period on several markets and is even close to 0.3% for some products.
Conversely, national brand market share decreases in most cases. Only two sectors
exhibit an increase in market share (margarine and cream).
5Here we report the national brands market share explaining our positive relationship.
6This result is confirmed by an exhaustive analysis on the 218 products showing that over the
156 significant trend coefficients of private labels market shares, 134 are positive (86%).
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With respect to the evolution of prices, we define the ratio ρ/ν as an approx-
imation of the per-period rate of growth of the price evaluated at the first period.
It is interesting to note that for all the products but one, when the trend coefficient
of national brands prices is significant, it is positive. Thus, national brands prices
usually increase by more than 0.1% up to 0.4% per period of 4 weeks.7
5. Results
We first report the results from models 1 to 4 for the 21 product categories.
Then, we extend the analysis using models 1 and 3 for all the product categories
(218).
5.1 Results on the 21 product categories sample
We report in Table 2 the main results for the four regression models defined
in section 3. In model 1, the private labels market share is the sum of PL and HD
market shares. Model 2 is identical, except that we add the differentiation index.
In model 3, we separately consider the three types of private labels (HD, PL and
FP). Model 4 is identical to model 3, except that we introduce the differentiation
index as an additional explanatory variable.
For each model, we test for autocorrelation and correct it using the Cochrane-
Orcutt method. Since the private labels market share may be endogeneous, we
conduct the Hausman test of endogeneity using appropriate instruments.8 For
each dairy product category, we first test relevance and validity of the instru-
ments.9 Then, using a Hausman test, we compare the parameters estimated in
the regressions performed with and without instruments. In most cases, the para-
meters estimated with instrumental variables are not significantly different from
the parameters estimated without instrumental variables.
7This result is also confirmed on the 218 product categories since 87% of the significant rate
of growth coefficients are positive.
8Available instruments are the lagged PL market shares for each type of private labels for the
current product category, the lagged index of differentiation of national brands if needed, as well
as the PL market shares for other products, and other caracteristics of the market (number of
producers, number of brands, etc.).
9To test the relevance of instruments, we check their significance on the first stage regression.
To test the validity of instruments, we perform the Sargan overidentification test.
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Moreover, in cases where endogeneity is detected, the corresponding coeffi-
cients in the regressions performed with and without instruments are very close
(and of the same sign). Consequently, we report only the regression results ob-
tained without instrumental variables in table 2.
Model 1, which is very close to the one estimated by Ward et al. (2002), leads
to the conclusion that, private labels development has a significant and positive
impact on national brands prices (except for one product category).
The index of differentiation defined for national brands (model 2) has a very
significant and positive impact on national brands prices. The index is highly sig-
nificant in 18 cases out of 21. Moreover, model 2 is considered better than model
1 in most cases. Finally, in model 2, when significant (15 cases out of 21) the
private label market share has a positive impact on national brands prices. This
confirms the results of Bontemps et al. (2005).
While Bontemps et al. show that an increase in hard discount (and first-price)
products has a negative impact in almost half of the cases studied, here the im-
pact of each of the three types of private labels is almost always positive when
significant (models 3 and 4). To test the relative impact of HD, FP and PL brands,
we use the Wald tests of equality between β ’s, and compare their values. When
significant (17 cases out of 21), we obtain :
βHD ≤ βPL
βFP ≤ βPL
Thus, the impact on national brands prices of an increase in the market share of
private labels is always larger than (or at least equivalent to) the impact of a similar
increase in the market share of either HD or FP. On the contrary, it is not possible
to systematically rank the respective impact of an increase in the market share of
HD and FP. Thus, it seems that national brands products do react positively to an
increase in the market shares of their different competitors even if this reaction is
of lower magnitude.
The role of the differentiation strategy in explaining national brands prices is con-
firmed by the results of model 4. Indeed, in 17 cases out of 21, the best model
includes the differentiation index.10 The relevance to introduce different private
10The best model is evaluated according to the AIC and BIC criteria.
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label categories is also confirmed as models 3 and 4 are considered as the best
models in 13 cases out of 21.
5.2 Results on all the product categories
In order to test the robustness of our previous findings, we extend the analysis
to all the product categories available in the database.11 In Table 3 we provide
some results about significance and signs of coefficients estimated in models 1
and 3.
Table 3: Positive and significant β ’s on Models 1 and 3
Significant Positive
Model 1 βPL+HD 116 103 (89%)
βPL 108 99 (91%)
Model 3 βHD 89 79 (89%)
βFP 73 57 (78%)
Positive β in models 1 and 3 on the 218 product categories
We confirm that the private label (PL+HD) effect on national brands prices is
positive when significant (103 positive βPL+HD within 116 significant in Model
1). Private labels (stricto sensu) effect on national brands prices is confirmed by
the same analysis with Model 3’s results.
The question of the relative effect of each of the different types of private
labels is also addressed here using model 3 on these 218 product categories. We
report in Table 4, test results on this issue for 144 products having at least one
significant β in the regression model 3. In 2/3 of the cases, private labels (sensu
stricto) have the largest impact.
11As explained above, we only estimate models 1 and 3 as the other models require to define a
specific subcategory for each product, a task that requires a case by case study.
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Table 4: A comparison of the β ’s on Model 3
βHD ≤ βPL
False True N. S.
False 11 2 5
βFP ≤ βPL True 5 96 5
N.S. 15 5 0
144
Results of the test for 144 products having at least one significant β in model 3
5.3 An analysis of private labels impact among products
In this section, we use the 144 products, having at least one significant β
in the regression model 3, to investigate the differences existing among product
categories (if any) with respect to the impact of private label development.
First, using characteristics of the product categories, we do a cluster analysis
of the product categories. We use different variables describing market structure
(number of brands, markets shares, relative prices, Herfindahl index, number of
varieties concerning the product, number of producers, number of shops where the
product is sold, trends of market shares and prices, ...) and consumer’s behavior
(loyalty index, interval between two purchases, ...).
Thanks to a principal component analysis, we select variables to reduce the di-
mension of the dataset. The clustering suggests two groups of products.12 Group 1
includes 73 products categories for which market is concentrated (higher Herfind-
ahl index), households are “loyal” to national brands, variation coefficient of the
average price and interval between two purchases are higher.13 Group 2 includes
71 products. The number of sales is higher in this group, there are more national
brands and hard discount products, more producers, private labels market share is
larger and the number of varieties greater, relative price of national brands higher,
number of observations higher, more brands, more PL.
Then, we perform equality test between these two groups for each of the three
coefficients measuring the impact of private label development on national brand
12We use the Calinski and Harabasz index.
13Loyalty index is defined for each household, as the total sales of national brands over the total
sales.
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Table 5: Equality tests and statistics on the β ’s in each cluster
Group 1 Group 2
Mean (Standard Error) Mean (Standard Error) Equality Test
Model 1 βPL+HD .077 (.0126) .174 (.0289) rejected
βPL .078 (.0115) .189 (.0284) rejected
Model 3 βHD .042 (.0069) .072 (.0156) accepted
βFP .050 (.0170) .042 (.0133) accepted
The equality test performs t-test on the equality of means. The result of this test is given at a 95% confidence level
prices, namely βPL+HD in model 1, βPL, βHD and βFP in model 3. We report in
Table 5 the results of these tests as well as statistics on the β ’s on Models 1 and 3
within each cluster.
Besides some products characteristics, the βPL+HD of model 1 and the βPL of
model 3 differ between the two clusters. Cluster 2 have a larger βPL meaning that
the impact on national brands products of this group is higher than the products
of cluster 1. In other words, products with a large number of varieties, frequently
bought, with a high private labels market share are products for which PL (sensu
stricto) have a stronger impact on national brands prices than the other cluster.
6. Concluding Remarks
The results we obtained in this empirical analysis are remarkably robust. When
we detected a significant impact of private labels development on the prices of na-
tional brands, this effect is positive in about 90% of cases. This confirms results
found by Ward et al (2002) on US data.
Moreover, results give also support to both ideas developed in this paper.
First, the impact of the different private labels is not identical. Increase in
the national brands prices vis a vis a development of hard discount products or
first-price products is lower than vis a vis a development of private labels.
Second, we find a significant effect of the product differentiation index. It
means that the increase in national brands prices is also explained by a strategy of
product differentiation by manufacturers.
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